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The Limits to the CJEU's Interpretation of Locus 













solution	 for	 the	protection	of	 rights	 that	are	not	 individualisable	 through	public	 interest	 litigation.	
For	53	years	 it	has	held	on	 to	 its	 interpretation	of	 the	 standing	criteria	 in	 (now)	Article	263	TFEU,	














Union	 regarding	 its	 standing	 criteria.	Where	 the	Plaumann	 criteria	 have	 always	 been	 criticised	 by	
both	academics	and	Advocates	General,	 this	criticism	focused	on	the	effect	of	 the	doctrine	on	the	
individual.1	 The	 new	 line	 of	 criticism	 focuses	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Court's	 interpretation	 of	
'individually	 concerned'	 has	 an	 even	more	 adverse	 effect	 on	 the	public	 interest,	 by	making	public	
interest	litigation	(PIL)	by	way	of	direct	actions	an	impossibility.	
This	 article	 aims	 to	 offer	 a	 theory	 on	 the	 reason	 behind	 the	 Court's	 severely	 restrictive	






for	 this	 contribution,	 a	 good	 timeline	 can	 be	 found	 along	 these	 lines:	 Gerhard	 Bebr,	 Judicial	 Control	 of	 the	 European	




Community	 Measures:	 Has	 the	 European	 Court	 Missed	 the	 Boat?’	 (2003)	 62	 Cambridge	 Law	 Journal	 77;	 Laurence	 W	













rules	and	 traditions	are	 the	 focal	point	of	 the	 culture	and	 traditions	of	every	 legal	order.	As	 such,	
every	apex	constitutional	court	is	not	only	limited	by	the	literal	requirements	set	out	by	the	law,	but	
sees	 its	 interpretative	 space	 as	 limited	 by	 a	 number	 of	 elements.	 This	 article	 aims	 to	 explain	 the	
CJEU's	 long-standing	 refusal	 regarding	 locus	 standi	 for	 the	 individual	 through	 the	 application	 of	 a	
theoretical	 framework	 that	 describes	 these	 limiting	 elements.	 The	 framework	will	 equally	make	 it	
clear	why	the	current	call	 for	access	 for	public	 interest	cases	will	be	even	more	difficult	 to	answer	
than	access	for	the	individual.5		








public	 interest	 litigation	 impossible.	This	will	be	 followed	by	a	discussion	of	how	the	 realisation	of	
this	problem	has	led	to	a	qualitative	change	in	the	criticism	of	the	Court's	case	law.	Finally,	the	last	
segment	will	be	devoted	to	the	moment	in	which	a	significant	change	has	occurred	in	all	four	of	the	
elements	 restricting	 the	 Court's	 interpretational	 possibilities	 and	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 limited	
judicial	response.	The	conclusion	will	offer	a	compelling	argument	for	the	Court’s	current	line	of	case	











interests	 of	 a	 large	number	of	 people,	 such	 as	 in	 environmental	 protection,	 consumer	protection,	
safety	at	work	and	anti-discrimination	policies’.8	
The	idea	is	that	by	asserting	the	possibility	of	a	public	interest	in	all	areas	of	European	law,	the	Court	
can	more	easily	 grant	 standing	by	making	use	of	 the	doctrines	 it	has	developed	 for	each	of	 these	
















Gormley	 opined	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	AITEC	 case11	 for	 the	 possibility	 for	 associations	 to	 be	
awarded	standing,	in	this	case	in	the	field	of	state	aid.12	These	are	only	two	examples	from	a	body	of	
work	 that	 comprises	 discussions	 of	 almost	 every	 field	 of	 European	 law	 imaginable.	 This	 lack	 of	 a	
clear	definition	 interferes	with	a	coherent	analysis	of	 the	actual	problem.	 It	 is	 therefore	necessary	
briefly	 to	 define	 PIL	 in	 a	 European	 context	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 concept	 causes	
difficulties	in	the	judicial	system	of	the	EU.	
The	 above	 mentioned	 authors	 make	 use	 of	 an	 interpretation	 of	 ‘the	 public	 interest’	 that	 is	
functionally	 equivalent	 to	 ‘the	 common	 good’.13	 Under	 that	 interpretation,	 all	 areas	 of	 law	 can	




from	 anti-trust	 to	 taxation	 -	 all	 could	 benefit	 from	 lawyers	 pursuing	 the	 common	 good.	 It	 was	












of	an	applicant.	Therefore,	 it	 is	proposed	that	 for	 the	current	discussion,	public	 interest	 should	be	
defined	 as	 those	 rights	 that	 are	 not	 individualisable.	 Rights	 that	 are	 individualisable	 can	 when	
bundled	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 collective	 interest,	 which	 merits	 other	 considerations.21	 The	 effect	 of	 this	
																																								 																				

















it	would	be	possible	 to	 rely	on	European	 Law	directly	before	 the	Belgian	Tribunal	 de	Travaux	 and	Conseil	 d’Etat.	 It	 is	 a	








definition	 is	that	the	traditionally	purely	economic	 interests	 in	the	cases	mentioned	by	Micklitz	fall	
outside	the	scope	of	this	treatise.	The	reason	that	they	cannot	be	individualised	lies	in	the	nature	of	





The	 problem	 in	 European	 law	 lies	 with	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 263	 TFEU	 and	 its	 earlier	
incarnations,	 in	which	 individualisation	 takes	pride	of	place.22	Although	 the	power	of	 the	Court	 to	
review	acts	is	sweeping	in	scope,	the	precise	extent	of	this	power	depends	on	the	class	of	applicants.	




to	 request	 the	 review	 of	 acts	 that	 affect	 their	 prerogatives;	 finally,	 natural	 and	 legal	 persons	 as	
addressees	of	an	act	or	when	directly	and	individually	concerned	by	said	act.25	

















of	 a	 regulation.	 Technically,	 this	means	 that	 all	 acts,	 including	 legislative	 acts,	 can	be	demanded	 to	be	 reviewed	by	 the	




Council	 [1962]	ECR	471:	 ‘Such	 is	the	system	that	the	 jurist,	 for	his	part,	might	find	unsatisfactory,	but	which	the	Court	 is	









State.28	 For	an	applicant	 to	be	 individually	 concerned,	 so	 the	Court	 concluded,	a	party	must	 show	
that	he	or	she	was	affected:		
[…]	 by	 reason	 of	 certain	 attributes	 which	 are	 peculiar	 to	 them	 or	 by	 reason	 of	
circumstances	in	which	they	are	differentiated	from	all	other	persons	and	by	virtue	




the	 rights	of	 specific	economic	actors	who	are	affected	by	 those	areas	of	European	 law	 that	have	
had	 the	greatest	 impact.	Problematic	 situations	 regarding	dumping,30	 state-aid,31	 and	competition	















four	 categories.	 Two	 of	 these	 are	 formal	 in	 nature:	 (1)	 the	 fact	 that	 (then)	 Article	 173	 EEC	 was	
																																								 																				
28	 It	did	not	 go	 into	 the	question	of	 the	 importer	being	directly concerned because, the Court reasoned, if the 
applicant was not individually concerned a further investigation would not be necessary as the demands 




























Court’s	 case	 law	 rather	 than	 the	 actual	 wording	 of	 (now)	 Article	 263	 TFEU.	 Do	 these	 criticisms	
succeed	in	elucidating	and	thus	remedying	the	role	of	the	Court	in	this	problem?	
The	statement	that	any	court	 is	applying	docket	control	 is	 in	 itself	not	remarkable.	Almost	all	 legal	
orders	make	use	of	a	form	of	docket	control	as	a	means	of	 judicial	management.	When	applied	to	
the	 European	 situation,	 the	 complaint	 is	 meant	 to	 illustrate	 a	 seemingly	 random	 or	 even	 biased	
element	 that	 is	 introduced.40	 This	 observation	 clashes	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Court	 has,	 over	 the	
years,	 taken	 a	 progressive	 approach	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 rights	 and	 principles	 in	 the	 European	
legal	order41	and	used	them	when	possible	to	individualise	parties.	Similarly,	arguments	to	the	effect	







to	 remain	within	 the	boundaries	not	unlike	 those	 in,	 for	 instance,	 France,	where	 the	possibility	of	
review	of	an	act	draped	in	democracy	is	severely	limited.43	The	Court,	however,	has	to	do	so	without	
the	benefit	of	carefully	categorised	and	qualified	acts.	The	impetus	for	this	contribution	is	therefore	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 scholarship	 on	 access	 to	 justice	 and	 the	 CJEU’s	 approach	 to	 standing	 does	 not	
engage	with	the	place	that	standing	requirements	have	in	a	constitutional	order.	One	can	conclude	
that	the	criticism	has	therefore	not	been	particularly	helpful	in	defining	if	and	how	the	Court	could	


























Furthermore,	 the	Court	 keeps	 reiterating	 its	 opinion	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 ‘complete	 system	of	 legal	
remedies’.47	Apparently	the	Court	itself	 is	aware	of	the	critique,	 is	clearly	not	afraid	to	bring	about	
change,	and	yet	 it	does	not	move.	Rather	 than	giving	reasons	 focusing	on	what	 the	Court	 is	doing	








can	 tell	 the	 story	of	 a	 state's	DNA.	 See,	 for	 example,	 the	 long	history	of	 the	 French	 limitations	 to	
judicial	 review	out	of	 fear	of	 the	 return	of	 judge-made	 law,	a	 trauma	 from	the	days	of	 the	ancien	
regime.48	Or	the	German	system	of	administrative	law,	based	on	the	protection	of	the	rights	of	the	
individual,	a	reaction	to	the	dark	days	in	the	middle	of	the	twentieth	century.49	Each	system	outlines	
the	relationship	between	the	 legislature,	 the	executive	and	the	citizen.	 In	each	system,	the	role	of	
the	judiciary	describes	the	relative	weight	of	each	of	these	actors	in	relation	to	each	other.	
These	 relations	 are	 governed	 by	 more	 than	 merely	 the	 written	 law.	 They	 evolve	 over	 time	 and	
indeed	in	France,50	Germany51	and	England,52	the	standing	regime	has	changed	significantly	with	the	
passing	 of	 years.	 This	 has	 often	 happened	without	 any	 formal	 changes	 to	 codified	 principles,	 but	
rather	 through	 the	case	 law	of	 the	courts	 themselves.	Yet	what	compels	 these	courts	 to	change	a	
rule	of	such	a	fundamental	nature?	What	makes	them	decide	that	they	have	the	authority	to	do	so	
at	that	point	of	change?	Lastly,	what	restrains	that	authority?	




− The	 constitutional	 relationship; the	 constitutional	 possibilities	 for	 legal	 challenges	 in	 a	
formal	sense	





A	 Comparative	 Study	 with	 an	 Instructive	 Model’	 (1942)	 91	 University	 of	 Pennsylvania	 Law	 Review	 and	 American	 Law	
Register	36,	39.	
49	Peter	Bucher,	Der	Verfassungskonvent	auf	Herrenchiemsee,	vol	2	(Harald	Boldt	Verlag	1981).	
50	 Philippe	Manin,	 ‘The	 Nicolo	 Case	 of	 the	 Conseil	 D’Etat:	 French	 Constitutional	 Law	 and	 the	 Supreme	 Administrative	
Court’s	Acceptance	of	the	Primacy	of	Community	Law	Over,	Subsequent	National	Statute	Law’	(1991)	28	CMLRev	499.	
51	B	Muller,	‘Access	to	the	Courts	of	the	Member	States	for	NGOs	in	Environmental	Matters	under	European	Union	Law:	












These	 elements	 were	 first	 found	 in	 David	 Feldman’s	 work	 on	 the	 comparison	 of	 diverging	




in	 the	 law	 and	 the	 meaning	 assigned	 to	 them	 by	 the	 legislator.54	 The	 constitutional	 relationship	
defines	the	basic	conditions	that	an	applicant	will	need	to	fulfil	in	order	be	eligible	to	have	her	or	his	
complaint	heard.	 In	general,	 there	are	 three	approaches	 to	 these	 requirements:	an	 interest	based	
approach,	 a	 personal	 rights	 approach	 and	 the	 actio	 popularis.	 In	 general,	 the	 interest	 based	
approach,	where	only	an	interest	in	the	act	under	review	needs	to	be	demonstrated	is	seen	as	more	
permissive	 than	 the	 personal	 rights	 approach,	 where	 the	 infringement	 of	 a	 right	 needs	 to	 be	
demonstrated.	The	actio	popularis,	where	any	party	can	ask	for	the	review	of	an	act,	is	very	rare.	The	
federalist	or	centralist	 tendencies	of	a	state	define	the	balance	between	central	and	decentralised	
government	and	the	relationship	that	these	 institutions	have	to	the	applicant.	 In	a	 federal	system,	
an	applicant	can	ask	for	the	protection	of	his	or	her	federal	rights,	whereas	a	centralist	state	will	not	
have	 this	 added	 layer	 of	 protection.	 The	 guiding	 principles	 of	 a	 state	 can	 often	 be	 found	 in	 the	
preamble	or	formative	articles	of	a	constitution	and	set	out	the	aspirations	of	the	state.	They	aim	to	
define	 the	 state’s	 nature.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Germany	 aims	 to	 foster	 friendly	 relations	 with	 its	
neighbours55	 and	 Canada	 adheres	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘Peace,	 Order	 and	Good	Governance’.56	 This	
cannot	only	help	as	an	important	teleological	tool,	but	 in	some	cases	a	court	will	be	able	to	award	
standing	on	 the	basis	of	a	government	acting	against	 its	 constitutional	nature	and	 limits.57	 Finally,	
fundamental	rights	not	only	logically	shape	the	interpretative	space	because	they	create	rights	and	
obligations	 but	 they	 are	 of	 interest	 as	 they	 can	 enter	 into	 the	 constitutional	 order	 through	
international	treaties,	creating	radical	shifts.	
























Although	authors	have	hailed	the	success	of	 the	constitutional	development	of	 the	European	 legal	
order,58	the	earliest	days	of	the	project	were	fraught	with	ideological	difficulties.	At	the	time	of	the	




mostly	 in	 a	 system	 after	 the	 French	 system	of	 administrative	 law,	with	 only	minor	 concessions.59	
Where	in	a	federal	context	a	supreme	court	has	far	reaching	powers	to	preserve	the	boundaries	and	
rights	 laid	 down	 by	 the	 agreements	 in	 the	 constitution,	 the	 system	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Rome	 was	
distinctly	 silent.60	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 the	 Court	 itself	 that	would	 cut	 through	 this	 Gordian	 knot	 in	 the	
famous	Van	Gend	en	Loos	and	Costa	v	ENEL	cases.61		
Given	 the	nature	of	 the	 fledgling	EEC,	 it	 is	not	 surprising	 that	no	mention	was	made	of	any	grand	
overarching	 ideal	 in	 relation	 to	human	rights	or	 the	 furtherance	of	peace	 in	 the	world.	Where	 the	
German	 preamble	 to	 its	 Constitution	 speaks	 of	 Germany's	 obligation	 to	maintain	 friendship	 with	
other	 people	 and	 secure	 the	 peace,62	 the	 preamble	 to	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Rome	 only	 hopes	 that	 the	
sharing	 of	 resources	 will	 lead	 to	 peace.	 Human	 rights	 were	 deemed	 to	 be	 covered	 by	 the	 newly	
created	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	and	were	deliberately	left	out	of	the	Treaty	text.	The	
only	rights	that	did	find	their	place	were	such	rights	as	the	right	to	equal	pay.63	 It	should	be	noted	
that	 these	 rights	 were	 mostly	 constructed	 to	 prevent	 any	 unfair	 competition	 between	 Member	
States,	such	as	the	use	of	women	as	low	cost	labour.	
In	 this	 context,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Court	 was	 extensively	 discussed.	 France,	 which	 had	 opposed	 the	
creation	of	a	court	since	the	days	of	the	ECSC	treaty,	did	not	agree	with	the	liberal	interpretation	the	
Court	had	given	to	standing	under	Article	33	ECSC.64	The	fact	that	industry	had	such	relatively	easy	
access	 to	the	Court	had	never	 fitted	well	with	the	French	concept	of	 the	European	project.	Article	
173	EEC	was	explicitly	given	a	limited	meaning	as	opposed	to	its	ECSC	counterpart.65	The	negotiating	
delegations	 were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 standing	 requirements	 by	 the	 Court	 of	
Justice	had	gone	too	far.66	A	more	limited	approach	was	explicitly	and	carefully	drafted	to	disallow	
overly	wide	access	to	the	Court	of	Justice.	This	is	perhaps	best	reflected	in	the	Spaak	Report,	which	





60	For	an	overview	of	 the	 struggles	of	early	American	comparative	 scholars	 in	defining	a	 federal	 jurisdiction,	 see:	Peter	
Hay,	 ‘Federal	Jurisdiction	of	the	Common	Market	Court’	 (1963)	12	AmJCompL	21;	Jerry	L	Mashaw,	‘Federal	 Issues	 in	and	
about	the	Jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Communities’	(1965)	40	TulLRev.	21.	
61	Morten	 Rasmussen,	 ‘Establishing	 a	 Constitutional	 Practice	 of	 European	 Law:	 The	History	 of	 the	 Legal	 Service	 of	 the	
European	Executive,	1952–65’	(2012)	21	Contemporary	European	History	375.	
62	‘By	the	will	to	fulfill	to	guarantee	the	liberty	and	the	rights	of	humans,	to	arrange	the	community	and	economic	life	in	
social	 justice	 and	 to	 serve	 social	 progress,	 to	 promote	 the	 friendship	 with	 other	 people	 and	 to	 secure	 the	 peace,	 the	
German	people	gave	themselves	this	condition.’	-	Preamble	German	Basic	Law	1949	
63	 Article	 119	 EEC:	 ‘Each	 Member	 State	 shall	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 first	 stage	 ensure	 and	 subsequently	 maintain	 the	
application	of	the	principle	of	equal	remuneration	for	equal	work	as	between	men	and	women	workers’.	













décisions	de	 la	Commission	européenne,	 sans	avoir	 le	pouvoir	d'y	 substituer	une	décision	
nouvelle.67	
There	 is	 explicitly	 no	mention	of	 judicial	 recourse	 for	 individuals	 and	 the	powers	of	 the	Court	 are	
further	limited	by	the	fact	that	 it	cannot	substitute	a	decision	by	the	Commission	through	a	ruling.	
The	 Court	 of	 Justice	was,	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes,	 increasingly	 an	 administrative	 court	 in	 the	
French	 tradition,	with	an	 instruction	not	 to	 travel	 the	 road	 it	had	gone	down	before.	As	 such,	 the	
constitutional	relationship	between	the	Court,	the	institutions	and	the	citizens	was	explicitly	limited.	
When	Plaumann	came	before	 the	Court,	 it	 found	 its	 interpretative	space	severely	 limited.	 It	 could	
not	 interpret	 federal	 safeguards	 to	 such	an	extent	 that	 the	 clementine	 importer	 could	be	granted	
standing,	nor	could	it	invoke	overarching	policy	principles	or	human	rights	that	could	be	used	to	give	
a	 more	 encompassing	 reading	 of	 the	 text.	 Perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 the	 Court	 knew	 that	 the	
drafters	had	given	a	very	specific	meaning	to	the	text	of	Article	173	EEC,	all	the	key	people	working	
in	the	sphere	of	the	Court,	be	that	on	the	bench	or	behind	the	scenes,	had	played	an	active	part	in	





impossibility	 of	 individualisation	 became	 clear	 from	 a	 series	 of	 cases	 beginning	 with	 the	 famous	
Greenpeace	case.	 In	this	first	case	in	which	an	Environmental	NGO	(ENGO)	contested	an	act	of	the	





earlier	 case	 law:	 associations	 will	 be	 granted	 standing	 if	 their	 procedural	 interests	 have	 been	
affected	or	when	their	members	are	each	individually	concerned.		
Greenpeace	 illustrates	 how	 EU	 standing	 requirements	 are	 ill-suited	 for	 the	 pursuance	 of	 public	
interest	litigation.68	Although	the	facts	of	the	case	are	problematic,	it	is	clear	that	the	Commission’s	
act	under	the	European	Structural	Fund	has	no	personal	scope	in	relation	to	specific	inhabitants	or	
economic	 operators,	 it	 is	 equally	 clear	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 act	 is	 not	within	 the	 domain	 of	 the	
legislative	measures	traditionally	cordoned	off	from	judicial	interference.	The	Greenpeace	case	was	a	
																																								 																				


















cases	 and	 the	 intra-institutional	 fight	 that	 ensued	 are	 not	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 the	 thesis	 put	
forward	in	this	contribution,	the	episode	did	contribute	a	valuable	element	to	the	discussion.	Jacobs	
opened	the	 floor	 to	a	wider	discussion	on	 justice	and	the	role	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	 fundamental	
rights	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 European	 law	 as,	 in	 his	 opinion,	 the	 Court	 did	 not	 adhere	 to	 these	
principles.73		
The	Opinion	was	remarkable,	not	least	due	to	the	role	that	the	Court	has	played	in	the	development	
of	 rights	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Even	 before	 there	was	 any	 discussion	 of	 Europe's	 accession	 to	 the	
ECHR,	 it	was	the	Court	of	 Justice	that	 found	and	enforced	human	rights	within	the	European	 legal	
order	through	the	concept	of	'general	principles'.74	The	Court	subsequently	made	use	of	these	rights	
where	it	could	to	individualise	certain	applicants	when	possible,	without	crossing	the	line	towards	a	
rights-based	 standing	 criterion;	 an	 option	 that	 exists	 in,	 for	 instance,	 Germany	 and	was	 explicitly	
dismissed	when	 the	Court	was	created.	 It	 should	also	be	kept	 in	mind	 that	although	 the	CJEU	has	
made	use	of	 the	 case	 law	 from	 the	 Strasbourg	 court	 in	 its	 discovery	 and	 interpretation	of	human	
rights,	 the	 right	 to	 fair	 trial	 and	 an	 effective	 remedy	 as	 set	 out	 in	 the	 ECHR	 have	 always	 been	
interpreted	in	such	a	way	as	to	allow	a	wide	diversity	of	standing	regimes.75		
Similarly,	the	introduction	of	the	concept	of	the	Rule	of	Law	came	through	the	Court's	ruling	in	Les	
Verts.	 The	 Advocate	 General's	 opinion	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 he	 considers	 this	 term	 to	 have	 a	 far-
ranging	 effect,	 as	would	 be	 expected	 from	 a	 scholar	 in	 the	 Common	 Law	 tradition.	However,	 the	
continent	 does	 not	 have	 such	 an	 extensive	 legal	 tradition	 in	 relation	 to	 the	Rule	 of	 Law,	which	 is	
reflected	in	the	subtle	differences	in	the	wording	of	the	different	language	versions	of	the	case.	The	
differences	 in	 meaning	 between	 Rule	 of	 Law,	 rechtsgemeinschaft,	 communita	 di	 diritto	 and	
rechtsgemeenschap,	combined	with	the	explanation	given	by	the	Court	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	









Tridimas	 and	 Sara	 Poli,	 ‘Locus	 Standi	 of	 Individuals	 under	 Article	 230(4):	 The	 Return	 of	 Euridice?’,	Making	 European	
Community	 Law:	 The	 Legacy	 of	 Advocate	General	 Jacobs	 at	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (Edward	 Elgar	 Publishing	 Ltd	
2008).	
72	Ad	n	70.	To	quote	Jacobs:	‘In	my	opinion,	it	should	therefore	be	accepted	that	a	person	is	to	be	regarded	as	individually	
















Authors	have	 taken	 the	argument	 to	heart	and	published	extensively,	pushing	 for	a	 change	 in	 the	
Court’s	 interpretation.78	 However,	 these	 arguments	 come	 from	 the	 wish	 of	 the	 authors	 to	 bring	















In	2009,	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 four	elements	 that	 create	 the	 interpretative	 space	of	 the	CJEU	
came	into	effect.	First	and	foremost,	the	entry	 into	force	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	brought	the	most	
significant	 change	 to	 the	 wording	 of	 Article	 263	 TFEU	 to	 date.	 Second,	 the	 Aarhus	 Convention	
formally	entered	into	force	in	the	European	legal	order.83	Last,	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights,	
incorporating	a	right	to	effective	judicial	protection	has	gained	the	status	of	primary	law.84	Although	














83	 Convention	 on	Access	 to	 Information,	 Public	 Participation	 in	Decision-Making	 and	Access	 to	 Justice	 in	 Environmental	
Matters	38	ILM	517	(1999),	as	approved	by	the	Union	by	way	of	Decision	2005/370/EEC	OJ	L-124	
84	Arguably,	the	Lisbon	Treaty	has	equally	caused	for	a	change	in	the	federal	nature	of	the	Union	through,	for	instance,	the	









new	 category	 of	 applicants.	 Although	 the	 article	 largely	 remains	 the	 same,	 the	 paragraph	 on	 the	
possibilities	for	natural	and	legal	persons	now	reads:	
Any	 natural	 or	 legal	 person	may,	 under	 the	 conditions	 laid	 down	 in	 the	 first	 and	 second	
paragraphs,	 institute	 proceedings	 against	 an	 act	 addressed	 to	 that	 person	 or	 which	 is	 of	
direct	 and	 individual	 concern	 to	 them,	 and	 against	 a	 regulatory	 act	 which	 is	 of	 direct	
concern	to	them	and	does	not	entail	implementing	measures.85	
This	 innovation	was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 discussion	 circle	 at	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Conference	 for	 the	
Constitution	 for	 Europe.	 During	 the	 negotiations	 on	 a	 constitutional	 document	 for	 the	 European	
Union,	a	broad	discussion	took	place	on	all	elements	of	European	law.	Within	the	discussion	circle	on	
the	 future	of	 the	Court,	 the	 issue	of	 standing	was	naturally	discussed,	but	 the	 solutions	proffered	
differed	widely.86	The	main	problem	seems	to	have	been	an	agreement	on	what	the	actual	problem	
was	 that	 needed	 to	be	 resolved.	On	 the	one	hand,	 there	was	 a	 camp	 that,	 in	 the	 line	of	 Jacobs's	
comments,	 wanted	 to	 see	 far-reaching	 change	 of	 the	 fundamental	 underpinnings	 of	 the	 Article,	
some	suggesting	the	need	for	a	rights-based	approach	to	judicial	review.87	On	the	other,	the	narrow	
view	of	the	problem	dealt	with	the	situation	 in	Jégo-Quéré,88	 the	one	situation	 in	which	this	camp	
was	of	the	opinion	that	an	actual	denial	of	justice	may	have	taken	place.	The	result	was	the	creation	




intercession	 of	 another	 body.	 	 Setting	 the	mesh	 size	 of	 netting,	 placing	 chemical	 agents	 on	 lists,	
these	are	types	of	administrative	acts	 that	have	a	direct	 relationship	with	those	affected	by	them.	









to	be	 interpreted	 in	 line	with	 the	case	 law	by	 the	Strasbourg	Court	on	 fair	 trial.91	One	of	 Jacobs's	
main	points	 in	 the	UPA	opinion	was	 the	 fact	 that	 even	 though	 the	Charter	 did	 not	 have	 a	 formal	


















While	 Lisbon	was	 dawning	 on	 the	 horizon,	 the	Union	 had	 committed	 itself	 to	 the	 obligations	 laid	
down	 by	 the	 Aarhus	 Convention,	 a	 ground-breaking	 international	 agreement	 that	 seeks	 to	 help	
citizens	in	the	enforcement	of	their	environmental	rights.	As	such,	it	is	built	on	three	'pillars'	that	aim	
to	 facilitate	 this,	 the	 rights	 of:	 access	 to	 information;	 access	 to	 decision	making	 procedures;	 and	
access	 to	 justice.	Whilst	 the	 first	 two	pillars	have	been	 implemented	with,	arguably,	 relative	ease,	
the	third	pillar	has	caused	a	lot	of	problems	within	the	European	system	of	judicial	protection.92	The	
premise	of	the	rights	of	access	to	justice	within	the	meaning	of	the	Convention	is	the	idea	that	every	
person	 should	 be	 able	 to	 have	 acts	 that	 affect	 his	 or	 her	 direct	 environment	 reviewed	 by	 an	
independent	body.	Not	only	that,	but	the	Aarhus	Convention	explicitly	creates	a	role	for	NGOs	in	this	




Given	 the	 changes	 discussed	 above,	 one	 would	 be	 forgiven	 for	 assuming	 that	 the	 Court's	
interpretative	space	has	changed	to	such	an	extent	as	to	create	a	possibility	for	the	Court	to	be	more	
lenient	 regarding	 PIL,	 at	 least	 when	 involving	 the	 environment.	 However,	 the	 opposite	 seems	 to	
have	happened.	 In	recent	case	 law,	the	Court	has	held	on	to	 its	classical	 interpretation,	gainsaying	
the	 claims	 of	 environmental	 organisations	 to	 their	 rights.	Where	 NGOs	 have	 tried	 to	 rely	 on	 the	




Where	 in	earlier	 cases	 the	Court	would	not	place	 too	great	an	emphasis	on	 the	 term,	accepting	a	
party	to	be	directly	concerned	when	the	member	state	giving	actual	effect	to	the	contested	measure	





considered	 the	 problems	 faced	 by	 both	 the	 individual	 applicant	 and	 public	 interest	 litigants.	 And	























the	 Union	 before	 the	 body	 that	 was	 instituted	 by	 the	 Convention	 to	 ensure	 compliance	 of	 its	
signatories,	 the	ACCC,	 the	 Institutions	have	 remained	 firm	 in	 their	 insistence	 that	 it	makes	correct	
use	 of	 this	 clause.99	 Furthermore,	 the	 Institutions	 have	 made	 their	 opinion	 clear	 that	 almost	 all	
environmental	 measures	 fall	 into	 the	 category	 of	 ‘legislative	 act’,	 a	 category	 exempt	 from	 the	
‘Access	to	Justice’	provisions	in	Aarhus.	Last,	but	certainly	not	least,	the	declaration	upon	approving	
the	Aarhus	Convention	by	 the	EU	explicitly	 refers	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	does	so	on	 the	understanding	
that	the	system	of	judicial	protection	will	not	be	affected.100	Again,	the	Court	finds	its	interpretative	
space	severely	restricted.		
It	 has,	 however,	 found	 a	 solution	 to	 its	 dilemma.	 Within	 the	 four	 elements	 of	 the	 theoretical	
framework,	the	Court	has	had	the	most	space	regarding	the	federal	nature	of	the	Union.	Although	at	
its	inception,	it	was	explicitly	not	federal	in	nature,	certain	elements	have	given	the	Union	at	least	a	
federal	 character.	 The	 preliminary	 reference	 procedure,	 and	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 Court	 has	
developed	it	is	one	of	those	elements.	In	recent	years,	the	Court	has	proactively	enforced	the	Aarhus	
Convention	 when	 the	 possibility	 arose	 through	 the	 references	 of	 Member	 States’	 courts.	 This	 is	
especially	 astonishing	 as	 these	 rulings	 go	 against	 the	 grain	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 procedural	










The	 use	 of	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 four	 elements	 that	 shape	 the	 interpretative	 space	 to	
illustrate	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice’s	 limits	 when	 interpreting	 the	 standing	 requirements	 offers	 a	
compelling	 argument	 regarding	 the	 Court’s	 well	 documented	 reticence	 in	 relation	 to	 access	 for	
public	interest	litigants.	It	has	been	demonstrated	that	the	Court’s	power	as	the	final	arbiter	of	the	
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whilst	 remaining	within	 the	 limits	 these	 elements	 set.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 has	 proven	 to	 give	 a	 better	
explanation	 for	 the	 Court’s	 behaviour	 and	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 analysis.	 The	 rise	 of	 public	 interest	
litigation	as	a	response	to	the	growth	of	the	European	Union	into	a	legal	order	that	goes	beyond	its	
merely	economic	origins	has	offered	a	challenge.	Although	changes	have	taken	place	as	a	response	







primary	 law	 cannot	 be	 directly	 changed	 through	 other	 legislation,	 be	 it	 international	 treaties	 or	
secondary	 law.	However,	 this	assumption	underestimates	 the	 role	of	 the	other	elements.	The	 fact	
that	 the	 Court	 is	 now	 building	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 preliminary	 reference	 procedure	 is	 more	
remarkable	that	one	might	assume	at	first	glance.	For	the	longest	time,	the	Court	has	stated	that	the	
procedure	 as	 it	 exists	 in	Article	 267	 TFEU	was	 not	 a	 remedy.106	 However,	 in	 the	 face	of	 changing	
circumstances,	 the	Court	has	developed	the	one	element	 in	which	 it	has	had	 the	 least	 limitations:	
the	federal	nature	of	the	judicial	system.		
The	 effects	 of	 this	 development	 are	 difficult	 to	 predict.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 possibilities	 of	
defending	these	interests	both	regarding	national	rules	and	Union	measures	have	increased	due	to	
the	Court’s	case	law.	This	effect	has	been	reached	whilst	still	complying	with	the	wishes	of	Member	
States	 and	 Institutions	 to	 keep	 the	 balance	 as	 it	 has	 always	 stood.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	more	
formal	criticisms	already	mentioned	by	Jacobs	remain	valid.	The	cost,	both	monetary	and	in	time,	to	
an	ENGO	before	it	can	actually	have	an	act	by	the	Union	and	its	Institutions	reviewed,	is	substantial.	
The	application	of	 the	Court’s	 intervention	 is	 also	 limited	 to	 the	 field	of	environmental	 law;	when	
social	rights	increase	in	importance	this	process	will	have	to	take	place	again.	Equally,	this	approach	
hinders	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 pan-European	 NGO	 movement.	 This	 not	 only	 hinders	 the	 pooling	 of	
knowledge	and	resources	but	has	been	argued	to	be	less	efficient.107	Although	the	final	conclusion	
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